High-speed rail construction and political incentives in China

RINA North America 55 E. Monroe Street, St 3450, Chicago, Illinois 60603

^* Corresponding Author: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

Published online: 3 August 2026

Abstract

This paper delves into the intricate relationship between political incentives and infrastructure development by examining high-speed rail (HSR) construction in China. Utilizing a novel dataset spanning several decades and a rigorous difference-in-difference methodology, the study evaluates whether HSR project approvals influence the career trajectories of prefectural officials and the economic performance of their jurisdictions. Contrary to prevailing assumptions, the analysis finds no significant evidence linking HSR project approvals to enhanced promotion prospects for local officials, regardless of their roles as mayors or party secretaries. Furthermore, the study highlights the absence of consistent economic benefits traditionally associated with such large-scale infrastructure projects, including infrastructure investment growth, GDP increases, and elevated land sales revenue. These findings challenge the established narrative that infrastructure projects are effective tools for political signaling and economic growth stimulation. Instead, the persistence of HSR expansion appears to be driven by alternative motivations, possibly rooted in centralized governance dynamics or non-economic factors such as regional integration and connectivity. The implications of this research extend beyond China, offering critical insights into the broader discourse on the interplay between political incentives and infrastructure development in authoritarian regimes.